This article provides a detailed comparative analysis of how EU competition law and American antitrust law approach the concept of price scissors as a form of abuse of dominant position. Price scissors represent a particular type of margin squeeze where a vertically integrated dominant firm sets prices for input and output markets in a way that makes it difficult for competitors to operate profitably. The concept has evolved differently in European and American jurisprudence. The study examines the theoretical foundations underlying each approach, revealing significant differences in economic analysis and legal reasoning. EU law has generally been more receptive to price scissors theories, while US antitrust law has been more sceptical. The comparative analysis extends to enforcement practice, examining how competition authorities and courts in each jurisdiction have applied price scissors concepts in practice. The case law reveals important differences in approach and outcome. The article considers whether convergence between the two systems is possible or desirable. While there are arguments for harmonisation, the analysis suggests that different legal and economic traditions may justify different approaches. The conclusion examines the implications for multinational businesses operating in both jurisdictions and suggests strategies for managing compliance risks in an environment of regulatory divergence.
The Convergence and Specifics of EU Competition Law and American Antitrust Law Regarding Price Scissors
2018-05-20By Dr Kane Abry