This article examines proposals for criminalising competition law breaches, questioning whether such measures can effectively address the challenges of competition enforcement. The traditional approach to competition law enforcement has relied primarily on administrative penalties and civil remedies. However, some jurisdictions have introduced or considered criminal sanctions for the most serious competition law violations. The article analyses the theoretical justifications for criminalisation, including deterrence theory and the expressive function of criminal law. It questions whether competition law breaches possess the moral wrongfulness typically associated with criminal conduct. Practical implementation challenges are examined, including the different standards of proof required in criminal proceedings and the impact on leniency programmes. The interaction between criminal and administrative enforcement raises complex procedural questions. The comparative analysis reveals significant differences in approach between jurisdictions. While some countries have embraced criminal sanctions, others remain sceptical about their effectiveness and appropriateness. The article concludes that criminalisation represents another attempt to "square the circle" of competition enforcement, but questions whether it can deliver the promised benefits without undermining existing enforcement mechanisms.
Available at: https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-1-2020/international/kane-abry-diaw-de-baye.