International Private Law: Focus on the Rome I Regulation

2025-09-22By Dr Kane Abry
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Rome I and the Applicable Law

Contract is the natural home of party autonomy. Case law acknowledges that the law applicable to contracts—whether as to their formation or their effects and conditions—is the law chosen by the parties.

This principle, generally accepted by the EU Member States and by existing international conventions, was taken up by the Rome Convention and then by the Rome I Regulation. Both instruments give wide scope to party autonomy, described as “one of the cornerstones of the system of conflict-of-laws rules on contractual obligations” (Explanatory Memorandum, recital 11). Parties may therefore choose the law governing their contract. If they express no intention as to the applicable law, subsidiary connecting factors apply. Special connecting factors exist for certain types of contracts in order to protect the weaker party. The Regulation, like the Convention, also contains mechanisms capable of displacing these principles in particular cases.

1. The parties’ choice of applicable law

In line with the Member States’ domestic laws, Article 3(1) of Rome I—like the Convention—enshrines party autonomy: “A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.” The Regulation’s primary aim of legal certainty and predictability (recital 6) explains the central role given to party autonomy. The chosen law binds both the parties and the court.

That freedom is not unlimited. Article 3(3) and (4) curb party autonomy where all elements are located in a single State or, respectively, within the European Union.

1.1. The affirmation of party autonomy

Article 3 clarifies how the choice may be made, what may be chosen, and when.

1.1.1. How the choice is made

Article 3(1) states: “A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice shall be made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or to part only of the contract.”

Express choice.

Most often, this takes the form of a governing-law clause in the contract. In theory, it could be oral, though proof would be problematic. In all cases, valid consent is required. Under Article 3(5): “The existence and validity of the consent of the parties as to the choice of the applicable law shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10, 11 and 13,” i.e. the rules on substantive validity, form and capacity.

In short, a choice-of-law clause is subject to the same regime as any other contractual term. In particular, its substantive validity is determined by the chosen law. Article 10(1) provides: “The existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern it under this Regulation if the contract or term were valid.”

The electio juris is therefore presumed valid ab initio: the parties may choose the governing law, and that law then retroacts to decide the clause’s validity.

As to form, the agreement on the choice of law is valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of either the chosen law or the law of the place of conclusion. Where the parties (or their representatives) are in different countries when they agree the clause, it is formally valid if it complies with the law governing the substance under this Regulation, or with the law of any country where either party (or representative) is then present, or with the law of any country where either party is then habitually resident (Rome I, art. 11(2)).

Article 11(5) contains special form rules for contracts creating rights in rem over immovable property or leases: where the chosen law differs from the lex rei sitae, the mandatory formal rules of the situs apply if, under that law, they apply irrespective of the place of conclusion or the law governing substance.

As to capacity, although governed by national conflict rules, Article 13 preserves the position where the parties are in the same country and, under that country’s law, an individual has capacity: that person cannot rely on incapacity under another law unless the other party knew, or ought to have known, of it.

Tacit choice.

A tacit choice must be “clearly demonstrated” either by the contract’s terms or by the circumstances.

From the terms: a tacit choice may be found where the parties adopt a standard form governed by a particular system of law, or where the contract refers to provisions of a named national code. That reference must, however, signify a real choice of law; it will not do if the cited text applies for another reason (e.g. as an overriding mandatory rule) or relates only to a minor aspect (such as a penalty clause).

Thus, references in a deed of sale to provisions of a particular national law may be read as an implicit choice of law for the whole contract. By contrast, neither the language of the contract nor the currency used amounts to tacit choice.

From the circumstances: a tacit choice might be inferred, for example, where a foreign public officer (a consul) acts—suggesting the parties intended the law of that State. More commonly the issue arises with linked contracts. Recital 20 of Rome I allows links between contracts to be taken into account for the escape clause, and recital 21 likewise for identifying the country “most closely connected.” Scholarship advises caution: linked contracts should not automatically be brought under the same law; courts should assess on a case-by-case basis whether the link justifies a common law.

Jurisdiction clauses.

Recital 12 provides that an agreement conferring exclusive jurisdiction on a Member State’s courts may be taken into account when considering whether a choice of law has been clearly made. The draft presumption in favour of the law of the chosen courts was not retained. A jurisdiction clause is an indicator, not a presumption. Recital 12 says nothing about arbitration clauses.

Overall, courts set a high bar for tacit choice. The prudent course, where the parties agree on a given law, is to include an express governing-law clause. In conveyancing, while the parties may in theory choose a law other than the lex rei sitae, that law will touch many aspects. As a rule, it is advisable to apply the law of the situs. Lawyers should explain this and recommend submission of the sale to the law of the place where the property is situated.

1.1.2. The object of the choice

As under the Rome Convention, the parties may choose any State law, even if it has no objective connection with the contract. Although not spelt out in the Regulation, it is accepted that the choice must not be fraudulent.

The chosen law must be State law. The Commission’s 2005 proposal—allowing parties to choose internationally recognised non-State contract principles—was not adopted. Whether instruments such as the UNIDROIT Principles are given effect is a matter for the chosen State law. Recital 13 clarifies that parties may incorporate by reference a non-State body of rules or an international convention; that is incorporation as terms, not designation as the governing law. Recital 14 adds that if the Union were to adopt substantive contract law instruments (e.g. model clauses), such an instrument may permit parties to choose it. Some writers contend that parties could opt for no law or choose non-State rules, subject to the forum’s (and possibly foreign) overriding mandatory provisions.

Article 3 also permits dépeçage (split-up): the chosen law may govern the whole contract or only part of it. In theory, each aspect (indexation, termination for breach, etc.) could be governed by a different law. In practice, coherence argues against slicing a contract: parties may otherwise create irreconcilable duties—for instance, Law A requiring termination for serious breach while Law B insists on continued reciprocal performance. In such cases, some propose treating the parties’ split-up as ineffective and applying the objectively appropriate law. The risks are acute in a sale of land, where any chosen law already competes with the lex rei sitae. Hence the preference for applying the law of the situs to the whole transaction.

Change in the lex contractus.

Does a subsequent amendment to the chosen law bind the parties, or is their law “frozen”?

The prevailing view is that if the chosen law changes after conclusion and the new rules are intended to apply to existing contracts, they will apply. The parties have chosen a legal order, not a static code. “Freezing” or “crystalisation” clauses are debated. Some reject them outright and would revert to the objectively applicable law if the parties only chose the law in the belief it could be frozen. Others say validity is for the chosen law to decide. Others again would, where the amendment is intended to apply to current contracts, disapply the chosen foreign law on public-policy grounds if the change upsets the contractual balance.

1.1.3. Timing of the choice

The parties may choose or change the governing law at any time (Article 3(2)). A later choice must not prejudice the contract’s formal validity or third-party rights.

2. Limits on party autonomy

Article 3(3) and (4) of Rome I preserve the application of mandatory rules where the contract is otherwise wholly domestic, or wholly European.

2.1. Purely domestic contracts

Article 3(3) provides: “Where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located in a country other than the country whose law has been chosen, the choice of the parties shall not prejudice the application of provisions of the law of that other country which cannot be derogated from by agreement.”

In other words, parties cannot “internationalise” a purely domestic contract by choosing a foreign law. If every element of the transaction is connected with State X, then the non-derogable rules of State X will apply regardless of the parties’ choice. Party autonomy is confined to matters which that law itself allows to be altered by agreement.

2.2 Intra-EU contracts

Article 3(4) provides: “Where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located in one or more Member States, the parties' choice of applicable law other than that of a Member State shall not prejudice the application of provisions of Community law, where appropriate as implemented in the Member State of the forum, which cannot be derogated from by agreement.”

This innovation in Rome I closes the door on using a third-country law to escape EU law. If all the elements of a contract lie within the Union, the parties’ choice of a non-EU law cannot deprive them of the benefit of EU mandatory rules.

3. Subsidiary connecting factors in the absence of choice

Where the parties have made no choice, the Rome Convention relied on a general principle of proximity: the contract was governed by the law of the country most closely connected with it. This was supplemented by presumptions (for example, that the characteristic performance determined the applicable law) and by specific presumptions for certain types of contract. A flexible escape clause allowed departure where another country had a closer connection.

Rome I has re-cast this system. It introduced fixed connecting rules for a number of standard categories, with a fall-back to the law of the party providing the characteristic performance, and a narrowly framed escape clause.

Under Article 4(1):

- a contract for the sale of goods is governed by the law of the seller’s habitual residence;

- a contract for the provision of services by the law of the service provider’s habitual residence;

- contracts relating to rights in rem in immovable property, or to tenancies of immovable property, by the law of the country where the property is situated (lex rei sitae). For short-term tenancies (no more than six consecutive months) for private use, the law of the landlord’s habitual residence applies, provided the tenant is habitually resident in the same country;

- a franchise contract is governed by the law of the franchisee’s habitual residence;

- a distribution contract by the law of the distributor’s habitual residence;

- a contract for the sale of goods by auction by the law of the country where the auction is held, if that can be identified; and

- contracts concluded within a multilateral trading system are governed by the law applicable to that system.

Where the contract does not fall within one of these categories, Article 4(2) provides that it is governed by the law of the country where the party required to perform the characteristic obligation has their habitual residence.

Finally, Article 4(3) contains an exception clause: where the contract is “manifestly more closely connected” with another country, the law of that country applies.

This structure reflects a compromise between certainty (through fixed rules) and flexibility (through the limited escape clause). It departs from the open-textured formula of the Rome Convention, where the “closest connection” principle dominated and the presumptions could easily be displaced. Under Rome I, the fixed rules are the starting point, and deviation is permitted only where the circumstances clearly point elsewhere.

4. Special connecting factors: protection of the weaker party

Both the Rome Convention and Rome I Regulation contain special rules for contracts where one party is deemed weaker and in need of protection. These include consumer contracts, employment contracts, insurance, and—under Rome I—certain transport contracts. The rationale is straightforward: party autonomy must not be used to deprive the weaker party of protections afforded by the law of his habitual residence or by EU law.

4.1. Consumer contracts under the Rome Convention

Article 5 of the Rome Convention applied to contracts for the supply of goods or services to a consumer for purposes outside his trade or profession, as well as to credit agreements intended to finance such supply. It limited party autonomy: even where the parties chose another law, that choice could not deprive the consumer of the mandatory protections of his home law, provided one of three conditions was met—

(i) the contract had been preceded by a specific invitation or advertising in the consumer’s country and he had taken the steps necessary there to conclude it;

(ii) the trader or his representative had received the consumer’s order in that country; or

(iii) the consumer had travelled abroad on a trip organised by the trader in order to make the purchase. In the absence of a choice, the law of the consumer’s habitual residence applied.

The provision did not extend to transport contracts, nor to contracts for services performed exclusively outside the consumer’s country of residence. It did, however, apply to package travel combining transport and accommodation.

4.2. Consumer contracts under Rome I

Article 6 Rome I recasts and extends these protections. It applies to any contract concluded by a consumer (a natural person acting for purposes outside his trade or profession) with a trader. The default law is that of the consumer’s habitual residence, provided the trader pursues or directs commercial activities towards that country and the contract falls within those activities.

The parties may still choose the applicable law, but such choice cannot deprive the consumer of the mandatory protection of his home law. If the trader does not direct activities towards the consumer’s state, the general Articles 3 and 4 apply. Certain contracts are excluded (e.g. services performed exclusively abroad, transport contracts other than package travel, rights in rem in immovable property, and financial instruments).

The concept of “directing activities” is particularly important in the age of e-commerce. Recital 24 clarifies that a website being accessible is not sufficient; there must be positive evidence of targeting, such as use of the consumer’s language or currency, references to customers in his country, or targeted advertising. The CJEU has held that a range of factors—international nature of the business, travel directions from other Member States, use of international dialling codes, or paid internet advertising directed at foreign users—may all indicate that a trader “directs” activities towards consumers abroad.

The effect is that online businesses which knowingly target foreign consumers cannot avoid the application of those consumers’ mandatory protections simply by choosing another law.

5. Overriding mechanisms affecting the applicable law

Even once the applicable law has been determined under Articles 3–8, three mechanisms can intervene to displace or qualify that law: public policy (ordre public), overriding mandatory provisions (lois de police), and the treatment of renvoi.

5.1. Public policy

Both the Convention and Rome I allow the forum court to refuse to apply a foreign law where its application would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the forum. This is an exceptional safeguard, to be applied restrictively. The assessment is case-specific: a foreign law that is in abstracto objectionable will not be excluded unless, in the concrete circumstances, its application would offend the forum’s fundamental principles. In practice, this ground is rarely invoked in contractual matters.

5.2. Overriding mandatory rules

Rome I devotes Article 9 to overriding mandatory provisions, defined as rules “the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation.”

There are two categories:

a. Mandatory rules of the forum. Article 9(2) makes clear that nothing in the Regulation prevents the application of the forum’s own overriding mandatory rules. Here, the ordinary conflict rules are displaced: the forum insists on applying its own imperative provisions.

b. Mandatory rules of another country. Article 9(3) allows the court to give effect to the overriding mandatory rules of the country where the obligations under the contract are to be performed, insofar as those rules render the performance unlawful. The court must consider their nature, purpose, and the consequences of applying or disregarding them.

This marks a narrowing compared to the Rome Convention, which gave courts wider discretion to take account of foreign mandatory provisions of any state “closely connected” to the situation.

In practice, mandatory rules often arise in areas such as consumer credit, financial regulation, labour law, and insolvency.

5.3. Renvoi

Renvoi—the reference by the chosen law to another system through its own conflict rules—is excluded under Rome I. Article 20 provides that where the Regulation designates the law of a country, it refers to its substantive rules, not to its conflict rules. This ensures certainty and prevents an endless referral chain.

6. Development of EU consumer law and its interaction with Rome I

Over the past three decades, the protection of consumers has become a central concern of EU law. Beginning with Maastricht, the Treaty expressly committed the Union to ensuring a high level of consumer protection, leading to a proliferation of directives in the field.

6.1. The proliferation of directives

The best-known example is the Unfair Terms Directive (93/13/EEC), but there are many others: on doorstep selling, distance contracts, consumer sales and guarantees, package travel, timeshare, and unfair commercial practices. Initially, these directives pursued only “minimum harmonisation”: Member States could go further in protecting consumers. More recently, the trend has shifted towards “maximum harmonisation”, where EU rules set both the floor and the ceiling, to promote uniformity in the internal market.

The 2011 Consumer Rights Directive consolidated and modernised several earlier instruments, introducing uniform rules on pre-contractual information and rights of withdrawal in distance and off-premises contracts. Further proposals, including the draft Common European Sales Law, attempted to create an optional body of contract law for cross-border transactions, though these have since been withdrawn. Newer initiatives focus on digital content, online sales, and enforcement.

6.2. Tensions with Rome I

Directives often include clauses designed to prevent circumvention by choice of law. For instance, Article 6(2) of the Unfair Terms Directive requires Member States to ensure that consumers are not deprived of the protection of the directive by a choice of foreign law where the contract is closely connected with the EU. Similar provisions appear in other sector-specific directives.

The difficulty is that these clauses have been transposed inconsistently by Member States, leading to fragmentation. Some jurisdictions treat the directive-based rules as overriding mandatory provisions; others rely on their general private international law. The CJEU, in Commission v Spain (2004), criticised overly rigid national transpositions and stressed that the open-ended “close connection” test must not be replaced by predetermined connecting factors.

French legislation, for example, has created a patchwork of spatial application rules across different consumer directives, each with its own criteria. This undermines the very uniformity which EU law sought to achieve.

The position under Rome I is clearer. Article 23 preserves the application of EU legislation which lays down its own choice-of-law rules. Where a directive prescribes that consumers must not lose its protection, this prevails over Rome I. The Consumer Rights Directive 2011 expressly recognises this, stating that it operates “without prejudice” to Rome I. However, because not all directives have been recast, overlaps and uncertainties remain.

Conclusion

The Rome I Regulation, like its predecessor the Rome Convention, is built on the principle of party autonomy: contracts are generally governed by the law chosen by the parties. That principle is tempered by limits—mandatory rules in domestic and intra-EU situations, fixed connecting rules where no choice is made, protective rules for weaker parties, and overriding mandatory provisions.

The overall structure seeks to balance certainty and predictability with fairness and public policy. Certainty is enhanced by fixed connecting rules and by excluding renvoi; fairness is preserved through the protection of consumers and employees, and through the possibility of applying overriding mandatory provisions.

The interaction with EU consumer directives illustrates both the strengths and the strains of this system. On the one hand, directives reinforce the consumer’s protection against choice-of-law clauses. On the other, inconsistent national transpositions and overlapping regimes risk undermining uniformity. The continuing evolution of EU consumer law will therefore remain a crucial factor in shaping the practical operation of Rome I.

About the author

Dr Kane Abry

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