“Should student unions, like universities, be prevented by law from non-platforming speakers?” [as enacted, but not brought into force, by the Academic Freedom (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023]

2026-01-15By Dr Kane Abry
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No platforming” describes a refusal by a student union or university to provide a forum to a speaker, typically because the speaker is associated with views regarded as racist, fascist, discriminatory, or otherwise harmful. The practice often appears in student union constitutions, bylaws, or university statutes, and it raises acute tensions between freedom of expression, the protection of others (including students), and the maintenance of an environment conducive to education. The question is whether student unions, like universities, should be legally prevented from non-platforming speakers.

A first point of legal architecture is that Article 10 ECHR is framed as a guarantee against “interference by public authority.” In orthodox terms, private bodies do not owe Convention duties in the same way as the State. On that footing, there is no freestanding, directly enforceable Article 10 “right to a platform” against a student union or a university as such, particularly where the institution is structured as a private entity. Nor does Article 10 confer a positive entitlement to be invited, hosted, or amplified. Even where Article 10 is engaged against the State, it is not a right to a particular microphone.

However, it does not follow that the law should be indifferent to no-platforming decisions by universities and student unions. Universities and student unions occupy a distinctive institutional position. They are not merely private clubs selecting dinner guests but they are central civic institutions fulfilling a public mission in the common interest. They exist to cultivate democratic competence, critical reasoning, and the contestability of ideas.

In that sense, the essential conditions of university life include freedom of expression and academic freedom. An institution that systematically denies space to contested viewpoints does not merely manage its reputation but it reshapes the intellectual environment in which students learn to test arguments, challenge error, and live with disagreement. That is why a legal regime closely aligned with the values and structure of Article 10 is normatively justified, even if Article 10 does not apply directly to universities and student unions as a matter of strict horizontal effect.

The appropriate approach is therefore not to pretend that student unions are public authorities for all purposes, but to recognise that Parliament may legitimately impose speech-protective duties on bodies that exercise gatekeeping power over a key public sphere. Such duties do not create an absolute right to be heard. Rather, they constrain the circumstances in which non-platforming is permissible and require decisions to be evidence-based, procedurally fair, and proportionate. This can be defended on at least three grounds.

First, universities and student unions are “bottleneck” institutions. A campus platform is not merely a physical room but it carries reputational validation and access to students as an audience at a formative stage. Exclusion therefore has outsized effects on public deliberation, even if the excluded speaker can post online.

Secondly, these bodies often benefit from public funds, public regulation, and public privileges. It is coherent to attach public-interest conditions to such benefits.

Thirdly, the internal governance of these bodies is vulnerable to capture by small, organised factions. A legal duty of viewpoint-neutrality within the law can protect pluralism without extinguishing protest or the ability to criticise speakers.

The central difficulty is to draw a principled line. Controversial ideas alone cannot justify exclusion, but some speech acts are not merely “controversial”, they are abusive, discriminatory, or pose demonstrable risks to public order. A robust test should therefore distinguish (i) speech that is lawful yet offensive or unpopular, which should ordinarily be allowed from (ii) speech that is tantamount to proselytism in the sense of targeted incitement, harassment, or dehumanisation of protected groups or (iii) speech that creates a demonstrable, evidence-based risk of disorder, intimidation, or rights-violations that cannot be mitigated by less restrictive means.

A workable legal test for when a student union or university may lawfully refuse a platform should have five elements.

1.⁠ ⁠Presumption of access for lawful speech. The default should be that a lawful speaker invited by a bona fide organiser is permitted to speak. The burden should lie on the institution to justify non-platforming. Mere offence, moral distaste, reputational anxiety, or anticipated criticism should not suffice.

2.⁠ ⁠Illegality and abuse-of-rights threshold (hard edge). If the proposed speech would involve unlawful expression such as incitement to violence, criminal harassment, threats, or speech prohibited by public order or equality law, refusal is plainly justified. In addition, the institution should be permitted to refuse where the invitation is being used as a vehicle for conduct that falls within the logic of Article 17 ECHR (abuse of rights) just like the Convention cannot be relied upon to destroy Convention values. The Strasbourg Court’s approach in M’Bala M’Bala v France [2015] ECHR No. 25239/13 illustrates the point and could be used as a valid framework for developing the now moot ban contained in the discussed legislation. In that case, French comedian Dieudonné’s Article 10 complaint was rejected because the performance amounted to overt anti-Semitism incompatible with the Convention’s “letter and spirit.” The relevance for campus policy is not that everything offensive loses protection, but that certain forms of expression; that is, overtly antisemitic, racist, or dehumanising displays designed to undermine democratic equality, can be treated as outside the protective rationale of free speech. Where the conduct is effectively proselytism of hatred rather than contribution to debate, refusal may be legitimate.

3.⁠ ⁠Demonstrable public order risk (evidential threshold). If illegality is not made out, refusal should still be possible only where there is a substantiated risk of disorder, intimidation, or rights-violations, supported by specific evidence rather than speculation. The evidential standard should require: (a) an identified risk, (b) a credible causal pathway from the event to the harm, and (c) a likelihood that is more than remote. “Controversy” or the possibility of protest is not enough. The institution must show why ordinary mitigation would not work.

4.⁠ ⁠Necessity and proportionality with “least restrictive means.” Even where a legitimate aim exists (public safety, prevention of disorder, protection of the rights of others), the institution must demonstrate that refusal is necessary and proportionate, and that less restrictive measures would be insufficient. Mitigations might include security arrangements, ticketing, moderated Q&A, structured debates, time limits, clear conduct rules, or alternative venues. This stage operationalises the logic of Article 10(2) i.e., what matters is not whether the institution dislikes the message, but whether restricting the event is the minimum required to avert a concrete harm.

5.⁠ ⁠Procedural safeguards and reasoned decisions. The decision must be transparent, reasoned, and timely, it should identify the evidence relied upon, the mitigation options considered, and why refusal is proportionate. There should be an internal appeal and, ideally, access to an independent review mechanism. A duty to give reasons is especially important because it disciplines decision-makers to move from ideology to justification.

This model also accommodates a form of “institutional restraint” whereby universities and student unions are neither neutral in the sense of indifference to the conditions of academic life, nor activist in the sense of treating their platform as a reward for ideological conformity. Their legitimate institutional stance is to protect the ecosystem of inquiry and debate. That means protecting robust, even abrasive, contestation, especially where speakers advance unpopular positions within the law, while being entitled to resist events that are functionally vehicles for intimidation, discriminatory abuse, or credible threats to public order.

Critically, the test must not collapse into “heckler’s veto.” If protest is expected, the institution’s first obligation should be to facilitate both speech and lawful protest, not to cancel the speaker. Only where protest-related risks are specific, serious, and unmanageable through proportionate mitigation should cancellation occur. Otherwise, the law would incentivise disruption as a tactic to suppress speech. The recent murder of Charlie Kirk invites us all to rethink this carefully.

In conclusion, while universities and student unions are not straightforward “public authorities” for Article 10 purposes, their public mission and gatekeeping power justify a legal regime that constrains non-platforming in a manner closely analogous to Article 10. The correct legal solution is not an absolute prohibition on refusal, but a structured duty whereby lawful speech should be protected by default, refusal must be justified by illegality/abuse-of-rights, or by demonstrable public order or rights-based risks, and any restriction must be necessary, proportionate, and procedurally fair. That framework preserves the essential conditions of university life, namely, freedom of expression and academic freedom, while recognising that speech that is tantamount to proselytism or hatred, or that creates evidenced risks that cannot be mitigated, may properly be excluded.

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Dr Kane Abry

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